Inheritance Forfeiture for Elder Abuse

Both houses of the Pennsylvania legislature have passed H.B. 1760, which was signed by the governor on July 1, 2024, becoming Act 40 of 2024.

Act 40 amends 20 Pa.C.S. Ch. 88 (which was titled “Slayers” and is retitled “Slayers and Elder Abusers”), as well as several other sections of Title 20, to deny persons convicted of elder abuse the right to any inheritance or other interest passing from the person abused upon his or her death. H.B. 1760 does this by amending the parts of Title 20 dealing with slayers so that they apply to persons convicted of elder abuse.

“Elder abuse” is defined as crimes committed under certain chapters of Title 18 when the victim is 60 years of age or older.

The changes made by H.B. 1760 will take effect 180 days after enactment, which presumably means that it will apply to deaths occurring on or after 180 days after enactment.

Constitutionality of Grantor Trusts

In Moore v. United States, 602 U.S. ___, No. 22-800 (6/20/2024), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the “mandatory repatriation tax” (MRT), which was enacted as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017 and required American taxpayers to pay a tax on income that had been accumulated in foreign corporations of which the taxpayer is a shareholder. In reaching that conclusion, the majority opinion (authored by Justice Kavanaugh and joined by four other justices) relied on the long-standing acceptance of Congressional power to tax shareholders and partners on the income of the businesses that they own.

Neither the majority opinion nor the concurring and dissenting opinions mentioned the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that tax the grantors of certain kinds of trusts on the income of those “grantor trusts.” (See “Overview: Benefits/Costs of Grantor Trusts” and “Intentional Grantor Trusts is Pennsylvania” for additional information on grantor trusts.) But a limit of the ability of Congress to tax owners of business entities is mentioned. In footnote 4 of the majority opinion, it is noted that there may be limits on the attribution of income under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, such as “limits based on the taxpayer’s relationship to the income.” Viewed by that standard, the grantor trust rules are almost certainly constitutional because grantors are taxed only on the income earned by trusts that are revocable or over which the grantor has retained powers giving the grantor some level of control over the income of the trust or the investments of the trust.

Similar constitutional issues might apply to the so-called “kiddie tax” imposed by IRC section 1(g), which requires that the unearned income of a minor child to be taxed at the marginal tax rates of the parents. The constitutionality of that tax has been upheld by several district courts, even though the Supreme Court had previously held that it was an unconstitutional violation of due process for a state to impose tax rates on a married person based in part on the income of his her spouse, stating that “because of the fundamental conceptions which underlie our system, any attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person’s property or income by reference to the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hoeper v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206, 215 (1931).

In Moore, the majority opinion specifically expresses no opinion on whether Congress could require shareholders to pay an income tax on the undistributed income of widely held or domestic corporations, or whether Congress could impose a tax on unrealized capital gains or a tax on wealth generally, so those issues remain for another day.

Gift of Salary Interpreted as Demonstrative Bequest

The decedent’s handwritten will included the direction that his “salery [sic] from NTM INC. shell [sic] be paid directly to [decedent’s surviving spouse] for a period of two years or until such time that she remarries, which ever occurs first,” which was interpreted as a demonstrative bequest of an amount equal to two years of the salary he was receiving at his death, rather than a specific bequest of salary payable after his death (which would be an invalid gift of something which the decedent did not own). In re: Estate of Ronald A. Weller, Deceased, 730 MDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 6/11/2024) (non-precedential).

Redemption Obligation Did Not Reduce Value of Shares

Under an agreement with the two shareholders of a corporation, the corporation was obligated to purchase shares upon the death of a shareholder for a fixed price, and the corporation purchased life insurance on the shareholders in order to have the cash needed to pay the purchase price. Upon the death of the majority shareholder, the life insurance proceeds were included in the value of the corporation’s shares for federal estate tax purposes, and the obligation of the corporation to purchase the shares was not a debt that reduced the value of the shares. Connelly v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, No. 23-146 (6/6/2024).

Removal of Father as Guardian for Son

The Orphans’ Court did not abuse its discretion to remove the incapacitated person’s father as guardian of his person when the father had breached his fiduciary duties by comingling funds, failed to comply with court orders by failing to provide financial records to the new guardian of the estate, and did not prioritize his son’s best interests when his son expressed wishes different from his father’s, and it was not an abuse of discretion to remove the father summarily and appoint the agency that has been serving as the guardian of the estate as the guardian of the person. In re: Estate of C.E.P., an Incapacitated Person, 2357 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 6/4/2024) (non-precedential).

Heirs Who Had Renounced Right to Serve as Personal Representatives Were Not Indispensible Parties to Removal of Administrator

A failure to give notice to an indispensible party deprives a court of jurisdiction, but the other heirs of the estate were not indispensible parties to an action to remove an administrator of an estate because the other heirs had renounced their rights to serve as personal representatives, and so the failure to give them notice did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. In re: Estate of Dorothy A. Anderson, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 PA Super 117 (Pa. Super. 6/5/2024).

[DBE Comment: This opinion may muddle the difference between the power to remove a personal representative, which lies in the Orphans’ Court, and the power to appoint a successor personal representative, which lies with the Register of Wills.]

Former Spouse Retained No Interest in Residence under Divorce Agreement

The decedent’s former spouse was not a co-owner as a tenant in common, and had no ownership interests in the residence that had been purchased by the decedent and the spouse during their marriage, because they had divorced and their settlement agreement provided that the residence was to be transferred to the decedent by the spouse even though the transfer was never made. The refinancing of the mortgage on the property by the decedent was not a modification or novation of the agreement even though the spouse signed the mortgage because the decedent was the only one personally liable for the mortgage note. In re: Estate of Richard A. Martin, Deceased, 963 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 5/21/2024), (non-precedential).

Lack of Evidence of Personal Property Taken

The executor of the decedent’s estate brought an action in the Orphans’ Court to recover the value of property alleged to have belonged to the decedent from a person who had lived with the decedent, but the court properly granted summary judgment when the executor was unable to produce any evidence of the identity, nature, or value of the property alleged to have been taken by the respondent even after discovery against the respondent. Marvin Samuels, Deceased, 2491 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 5/21/2024), (non-precedential).

Denial of Expanded Intervention Was Abuse of Discretion

The intervenors were initially allowed to join in the litigation only for the purpose of determining whether the person with whom they had reached a settlement agreement was validly serving as the trustee of the trust, and it was an abuse of discretion for the Orphans’ Court to deny them expanded intervention when the litigation now includes disputes over both the ownership of the rights purchased by the intervenors and the distribution of the funds that were paid to the trust by the intervenors, which the intervenors might now claim if the trust did not own the rights that the intervenors purchased. In re: Dille Family Trust, 1326 WDA 2022 (Pa. Super. 5/16/2024) (non-precedential).

[For other decisions involving this trust, see “Choice of Law for Administration of Trust,” summarizing  96 WDA 2022 and 97 WDA 2022 (Pa. Super. 9/19/2023) (non-precedential), “Contempt Affirmed over Situs Dispute,” summarizing 853 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 9/11/2023) (non-precedential), and “Situs of Trust Was Not Effectively Changed by Beneficiaries,” summarizing  26 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 5/16/2024) (non-precedential).]