Supreme Court to Decide State Income Tax Case

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the appeal of the North Carolina Department of Revenue in North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), No. 18-457 (U.S.S.C. 1/11/2018).

The North Carolina Supreme Court had held that the imposition of an income tax on the undistributed income of a New York trust merely because a beneficiary of the trust resided in North Carolina violated the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution. The trust was created by a New York resident under New York law, the trustee resided in Connecticut, the trust assets were marketable securities held by a custodian in Massachusetts, and the beneficiary who had moved to North Carolina after the trust was created had no power to withdraw any income or principal of the trust.

The “questions presented” (taken from the petition for cert.) is as follows:

More than $120 billion of our nation’s income flows through trusts. That income is a vital source of tax revenue for the states. Eleven states, including North Carolina, tax trust income when a trust’s beneficiaries are state residents.

For the last ninety years, however, this Court has been silent on whether these taxes comport with due process. The Court’s last words on the subject come from the Pennoyer era of due-process analysis. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). As a result, lower courts and state taxing authorities have been searching in vain for modern guidance.

There is now a direct split spanning nine states. Four state courts have held that the Due Process Clause allows states to tax trusts based on trust beneficiaries’ in-state residency. Five state courts, including two state supreme courts this year, have concluded that the Due Process Clause forbids these taxes.

The Due Process Clause should not have different meanings in different states particularly when billions of dollars of state-tax revenue hang in the balance. The question presented to this Court is:

Does the Due Process Clause prohibit states from taxing trusts based on trust beneficiaries’ in-state residency?


Insufficient Evidence of Incapacity

The court was not required to accept the option of a psychologist as to incapacity when the psychologist administered a single test and did not examine medical records, the alleged incapacitated person appeared in court and provided lucid and compelling testimony, and the alleged incapacitated persons son and other friends and relatives were adequately caring for her, so denial of the petition for adjudication of incapacity was supported by the weight of the evidence. Estate of Rose Phillips, an Alleged Incapacitated Person, 8 Fid.Rep.3d, No. 539AI of 2017 (O.C. Philadelphia 2017), aff’d 2331 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. 11/14/2018) (non-precedential).

Gift to Disbanded Ambulance Association

Testamentary gift to disbanded volunteer ambulance association was awarded under the cy pres doctrine to a volunteer fire department providing first responder services to the same community. Estate of Kendell B. Cramer, Deceased, 8 Fid.Rep.3d 315 (O.C. Monroe Co. 2018)

CLAT Webcalculator

A new Webcalculator for charitable remainder lead trusts (CLATs) is now up and running.  It includes computations of the payouts necessary to zero-out the noncharitable remainders of CLATs with increasing annuity payouts and “shark fin” CLATs in which the remainder is minimized by increasing the final annuity payment.

Delaware Co. Fees Amended

Delaware County has amended its fee schedule for the Register of Wills and Orphans’ Court, increasing per page certification fees to $1.00 per page, to be effective February 1, 2019. “Amendments to the Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans’ Court Division Fee Schedules; File No. 795-2018” (Delaware Co. 12/10/2018), 49 Pa.B. 12 (1/5/2019).

CRAT Webcalculator

A new Webcalculator for charitable remainder annuity trusts (CRATs) is now up and running.  It includes projections for when a trust might terminate if the trust incorporates the language of Rev. Proc. 2016-42 so that the trust terminates before it exhausts, and the 5% exhaustion test of Rev. Rul. 77-374 does not apply.