In an appeal from probate, the court found “without hesitation” that a May 2009 will admitted to probate was forged, because the timeline of the proponent of the will got the weekend of a family gathering wrong, meaning three witnesses (including a notary), perjured themselves. Pendergrass Estate, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 159 (OC Mont. 2014) (Opinion by Ott, J.)
Testator died leaving a trust under her will for her children, creating powers of appointments for each child, and an administrative power, allowing the removal of the corporate trustee with the consent of all income beneficiaries. After the death of one of the children and his exercise of the power of appointment under his will, the new income beneficiaries removed the corporate trustee and appointed a new trustee. The removed corporate trustee refused, and the beneficiaries sought declaratory judgment. Court held that the exercise of a power of appointment incorporates the new beneficiaries (and any other provisions allowed) into the original trust under the original will, meaning the corporate trustee was effectively removed. Jurisdiction in Montgomery County was not proper, but Court acted so as to resolve the issue, but all further litigation must be in Delaware County. Cassatt Trust, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 151 (OC Mont. 2015) (Opinion by Murphy, J.)
Brother of decedent was bequeathed the “Maujer rifle”, which is a typographical error for Mauser rifle of which the decedent owned 10. The Court held that the brother was entitled to all 10 Mauser rifles because of the wills ambiguity and the extrinsic evidence presented. The extrinsic evidence (mostly the brother testifying to what the decedent had told him) was challenged as inadmissible hearsay or irrelevant under the Dead Man Act. The Court allowed the testimony, because it was the decedents intent or plan (hearsay exception Pa.R.E. 803(3)) and the devisavit vel non exception to the Dead Man Act applied (all witnesses competent to testify to testamentary distributions). Estate of Wilson Fox v. Glenn Fox, Jr., 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 181 (OC Somer. 2014) (Opinion by Klementik, J.)
In affirming the denial of a petition to strike a default judgment, the Superior Court held that the civil division of the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against an agent for the debts of the principal, and that a petition to strike a judgment was not a proper remedy when it was alleged that the default judgment had been entered after the principal had died. Green Acres Rehabilitation and Nursing Center v. Henry Sullivan and Henrietta Sullivan, 2015 PA Super 73, No. 2084 EDA 2014 (4/13/2015).
Under I.R.C. § 2206, an executor was entitled to recover a pro-rata portion of the federal estate tax attributable to life insurance paid to the decedent’s ex-wife, as well as interest paid on the tax, when the will directed that death taxes be apportioned, and so the decedent had not “directed otherwise” for purposes of § 2206. However, the ex-wife was not responsible for the estate tax on deferred compensation, IRAs, and other benefits because they are outside the scope of § 2206 and the provisions of the decedent’s will directing apportionment of taxes did not apply to the ex-wife because she was divorced from the decedent after the will was written. Thomas H. Smoot III, Executor v. Dianne M. Smoot, 2015 TNT 69-13, No. 2:13-cv00040 (U.S.D.C. S.D. Ga. 3/31/2015) (applying Georgia law).
[Note: It was alleged that Georgia has no law requiring the apportionment of estate tax, but the court found that it did not have to reach that issue. That seems wrong considering the court’s holding that the provisions of the will were inapplicable.]
It is quite common for a broker or other payor to issue Forms 1099-INT or 1099-DIV in the name of the decedent, and with the decedent’s security number, reporting income received after death. This happens because brokers continue to record…
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Court-approved settlement between guardian of the estate of the decedent and one of the decedent’s children precluded claim against the child for funds of the decedent that had benefited the child during decedent’s incapacity. The court also found that the child’s share of the estate should not be reduced by a lifetime gift of an interest in the decedent’s home, despite a letter stating that the gift was intended as a “forwarding of inheritance as well as an investment in the property,” because the property had been sold by the guardian and the child had received none of the proceeds of sale. The court therefore exercised its equitable discretion to order the estate divided among all of the children in equal shares. Tarquini Estate, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 132 (O.C. Montgomery 2015) (Opinion by Ott, J.)
Parental rights of both mother and father terminated under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 when 11 year old child had been in foster care for more than six months, both parents failed to make progress in correcting the conditions that led to placement in foster care, and termination of parental rights will best serve the needs of the child by making him available for adoption. In re D.R.S.C., 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 122 (O.C. Chester 2015) (Opinion by Tunnell, J.)
A pre-1993 oral contract to make a will was found to have been established by the testimony of the beneficiary’s husband, brother, and nephew, and the beneficiary was found to have substantially performed her obligations under the contract when she was prevented from continuing to care for her father by her father’s own actions. Meyers Estate, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 107 (O.C. Montgomery 2015) (Opinion by Murphy, J.), aff’d, No. 1063 EDA 2015 (Pa. Super. 2/17/16) (non-precedential).
[See 20 Pa.C.S. § 2701 for the evidence needed to establish a contract relating to inheritance entered into after December 16, 1992.]
Declaratory judgment was appropriate to hold that second spouse, who had not elected against will executed before her marriage to the decedent, was entitled to an intestate share of the decedent’s revocable trust which was also executed before marriage, and that the decedent’s residence was owned entirely by a trust of the deceased first spouse, the decedent having disclaimed his survivorship rights to half of the property following the first spouse’s death and then later conveyed his remaining one half interest to the trust. Kulig Trust, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 93 (O.C. Bucks Co. 2014) (Memorandum opinion by Fritsch, J.), aff’d 131 A.3d 494, 2015 PA Super 271, No. 2891 EDA 2014 (12/24/2015), rev. and remanded 97 MAP 2016, (Pa. 12/19/2017).