No Jurisdiction over Burial Dispute of Non-Domiciliary

The Philadelphia Orphans’ Court had no jurisdiction in a dispute over the burial of the decedent because the decedent was not domiciled in Pennsylvania and owned no property in Philadelphia, the decedent died outside of Pennsylvania, the decedent’s body was located in Pennsylvania but outside of Philadelphia, and the only connection to Philadelphia was that the decedent’s will directed that the decedent should be buried in a cemetery in Philadelphia. Singer Estate, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 240 (Philadelphia O.C. 2025), on appeal, 993 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super.)

Beneficiary’s Attempt to Exercise Limited Testamentary Power of Appointment Invalid

In an action by the estate of a beneficiary of a trust and the charitable organization to which she attempted to appoint her share of the trust against the trustees for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to create a separate trust for the beneficiary so that she would have a testamentary power of appointment over the separate trust, summary judgment was not appropriate for defenses based on the statute of limitations for claims by beneficiaries against trustees, as well as the doctrine of laches, because there were genuine issues of material fact. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the trustees on the issue of whether the charitable organization created by the beneficiary was a proper appointee of trust property because the trust document defined “Charity” (with a capital “c”) as organizations selected by the trustees, and the trust document did not ever use the word “charity” without capitalization. Because the charitable organization to which the beneficiary attempted to exercise the power of appointment was not a “Charity” selected by the trustees, the attempted exercise of the power of appointment was invalid, and there can be no surcharge against the trustees for failing to create a separate trust because her charitable organization would have received nothing even if the separate trust had been created. Scaife Trust, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 223 (Allegheny O.C. 2025), on appeal, 866 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super.).

Use of Passive Voice Did Not Restrict Class

The class of grandchildren “been so named [Morris]” included those grandchildren who as adults legally changed their names to include “Morris” as a middle name and the testator’s use of the passive voice did not imply that the grandchildren must have received the name at birth and could not later change their own names. Morris Trust, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 205 (Chester O.C. 2025).

Testimony of Claimant Barred by Dead Man’s Act

The claimant against the estate was barred by the Dead Man’s Act from testifying about the formation, terms, or performance of an alleged oral contract with the decedent and, in the absence of any other testimony or documentary evidence of the alleged contract, the claim was denied. Compensatory damages having been denied, punitive damages were also denied. Hartman Estate, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 165 (Indiana O.C. 2023).

Removal of Both Children as Executors

Both children removed as executors of parents’ estates when the executors had failed to sell or distribute the sole remaining property of one of the estates after more than 10 years, there was hostility between the executors, and one of the executors had both signed checks without the other’s knowledge or permission and had blatant conflicts of interest. Breitlauch Estates, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 159 (Monroe O.C. 2025).

Beneficiary Entitled to Notice of Petition and Hearing on Removal of Executor

A residuary beneficiary is entitled to notice of the filing of a petition to remove the executor of the estate, and notice of the hearing on the petition. The order of the Orphans’ Court removing the executor and ordering the beneficiary to vacate the decedent’s residence was therefore vacated and the case remanded. The issue of whether the beneficiary had standing was not raised by any party and so was waived, and it was improper for the Orphans’ Court to raise it sua sponte. In re: Estate of Dolores Mae Zupancic, 1483 WDA 2024 (Pa. Super. 10/28/2025) (non-precedential).

Sale of Specifically Devised Property Approved

A sale of real property that had been specifically devised was approved when the estate was otherwise without sufficient funds to pay debts and expenses, and the offer made by the devisee was “woefully inadequate” compared to the price under the contract already signed by the executor. The court was not required to hold a hearing on the removal of the executor before approving the sale when the request to remove the executor came in an answer to the petition for approval of the sale and not in a separate petition. Pstrak Estate, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 116 (Luzerne O.C. 2022), aff’d 936 MDA 2022 (Pa. Super. 4/17/2024) (non-precedential).

[DBE Comment: The Superior Court stated that the joinder of the specific devisees of the property was not required because the will included a general power to sell property “without excepting specifically devised property,” but that conclusion seems to violate the principle of construction that a specific provision overrides a general provision. A provision of a will making a specific disposition of a specific property should therefore override a general direction that that executor is able to sell property and that general direction does not expressly override specific gifts of property. It is also not clear what “joinder” means in this context because the opinion of the Orphans’ Court stated that a citation was served on all parties to show cause why the petition to allow the sale should not be granted, and the objecting devisee was in fact a party to the proceeding.]

Counsel Fees of Guardians Denied

It was not an abuse of discretion for the Orphans’ Court to deny a petition for counsel fees from the petitioners and guardians of the alleged incapacitated person when there was no evidence presented as to the ability of the estate of the AIP to pay the fees, the requested fees included time spent on disputes between the petitioners over which of them should be the guardian, and the requested fees included time spent on petitioning for the fees. In re: M.A.D., an Alleged Incapacitated Person, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 95 (Berks O.C. 2025), on appeal, 191 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super.).