The fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege does not apply to attorney records relating to a civil action brought by a trustee against one of the beneficiaries to enforce an indemnification agreement entered into for a distribution to that beneficiary, and so those records remain subject to attorney-client privilege. In re: First and Partial Account of Gerald L. Hempt, Trustee for the Max C. Hempt QTIP Trust, ___ A.4th ___, 2025 PA Super 2054 (11/13/2025).
It was not a breach of fiduciary duty for the proceeds of sale of a property to be paid half to the two co-owners, mother and daughter, even though the daughter was the mother’s agent under a general power of attorney, when the mother purchased the property before executing the power of attorney and the addition of the daughter’s name as a co-owner when the property was purchased was solely the decision of the mother. There was also no evidence that the daughter had any role in the sale of the property other than signing a listing agreement that the mother later ratified. Although the grant of a power of attorney may be evidence of a prior confidential relationship, there was no evidence that the daughter had an “overmastering influence” on her mother or that the mother was not making her own decisions about the purchase and sale of the property. A claim by the mother against the daughter for withdrawing money from a joint account was denied because the money deposited to the account came from the daughter, and so the daughter remained the owner of the account during her lifetime. (Other issues addressed by the court included a breach of contract claim, the rights of co-owners of property, evidentiary rulings, and the denial of a claim for punitive damages.) Purcell v. Caples, 1818 EDA 2023, 1963 EDA 2023, 1964 EDA 2023, 1210 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. 11/14/2025) (non-precedential).
It was an error of law, and so an abuse of discretion, for the Orphans’ Court to deny a third petition for a guardian of the person when there was evidence that the electroconvulsive treatments (“ECT”) that were administered to the incapacitated person (IP) with the consent of the emergency guardian and temporary guardian appointed in accordance with the first two petitions were effective but the IP’s mental illnesses had returned, and so there was a new emergency allowing the use of the emergency guardianship procedure, as well as evidence that the IP would suffer irreparable harm without additional ECT. In re: L.L.H., 1420 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. 11/14/2025) (non-precedential).
Objection to notice of intention to serve subpoenas on medical providers was denied even though the subpoenas covered time periods not relevant to whether the decedent had testamentary capacity, but a motion for a protective order was granted and the use of the subpoened material was limited to the current proceeding and directed to be destroyed at the conclusion of the proceeding. Although some procedural errors were disregarded, relief requested as a part of a “new matter” was denied without prejudice to seek the relief by a proper motion or petition. Palla Estate, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 278 (Northampton O.C. 2024).
After being removed as executor, the former executor was held in contempt for failing to turn over the assets and records of the estate to the successor executor, for failing to file an account of her administration of the estate, and for failing to appear in court to respond to the petitions for contempt and to answer for her failure to account. A judgment for surcharge was also entered against the former executor for the full value of all known estate assets, as well as the attorney fees and court costs of the successor executor. Heller Estate, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 272 (Monroe O.C. 2025).
A denial of a motion for recusal is an interlocutory order not subject to appeal. It is also not error for a judge to preside at the hearing on the recusal motion, for the judge to refuse to allow himself to called as a witness in the recusal hearing, or for the judge to deny the motion to recuse when the only evidence of bias is rulings against the movant and the movant’s attorney. Fetzer v. Fetzer, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 249 (Berks C.D. 2025) (child custody proceeding), appeal quashed sua sponte, 1093 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. 9/12/2025).
The Philadelphia Orphans’ Court had no jurisdiction in a dispute over the burial of the decedent because the decedent was not domiciled in Pennsylvania and owned no property in Philadelphia, the decedent died outside of Pennsylvania, the decedent’s body was located in Pennsylvania but outside of Philadelphia, and the only connection to Philadelphia was that the decedent’s will directed that the decedent should be buried in a cemetery in Philadelphia. Singer Estate, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 240 (Philadelphia O.C. 2025), on appeal, 993 EDA 2025 (Pa. Super.)
In an action by the estate of a beneficiary of a trust and the charitable organization to which she attempted to appoint her share of the trust against the trustees for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to create a separate trust for the beneficiary so that she would have a testamentary power of appointment over the separate trust, summary judgment was not appropriate for defenses based on the statute of limitations for claims by beneficiaries against trustees, as well as the doctrine of laches, because there were genuine issues of material fact. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the trustees on the issue of whether the charitable organization created by the beneficiary was a proper appointee of trust property because the trust document defined “Charity” (with a capital “c”) as organizations selected by the trustees, and the trust document did not ever use the word “charity” without capitalization. Because the charitable organization to which the beneficiary attempted to exercise the power of appointment was not a “Charity” selected by the trustees, the attempted exercise of the power of appointment was invalid, and there can be no surcharge against the trustees for failing to create a separate trust because her charitable organization would have received nothing even if the separate trust had been created. Scaife Trust, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 223 (Allegheny O.C. 2025), on appeal, 866 WDA 2025 (Pa. Super.).
The class of grandchildren “been so named [Morris]” included those grandchildren who as adults legally changed their names to include “Morris” as a middle name and the testator’s use of the passive voice did not imply that the grandchildren must have received the name at birth and could not later change their own names. Morris Trust, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 205 (Chester O.C. 2025).
The claimant against the estate was barred by the Dead Man’s Act from testifying about the formation, terms, or performance of an alleged oral contract with the decedent and, in the absence of any other testimony or documentary evidence of the alleged contract, the claim was denied. Compensatory damages having been denied, punitive damages were also denied. Hartman Estate, 3 Fid.Rep.4th 165 (Indiana O.C. 2023).