Administration of Terminating Trust until Disputes Are Resolved

Applying Florida law, the court denied motions: (a) to order distribution of the entire trust even though the beneficiary had reached the age of 35 and had exercised his right to withdraw the balance of the trust, and instead allowed the trustee to retain a reserve of $85,000, because there were objections to the accounts of the trustee still to be adjudicated and the expenses of the trustee had not yet been determined, (b) to compel the trustee to return funds because there was insufficient evidence of a breach of trust by the trustee, but the denial was without prejudice pending further findings by a master, and (c) to impose sanctions on the trustee for violating orders of the court because there was no evidence that the trustee had acted in bad faith. Harrison Trust, 1 Fid.Rep.4th 244 (Bucks O.C. 2023), on appeal, 1784 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super.)

[For an earlier opinion in this same case, see “Trustee Cannot Deny Withdrawals by Beneficiary with ADHD,” summarizing Harrison Trust, 11 Fid.Rep.3d 116 (Bucks O.C. 2021) (trust governed by Florida law), aff’d 635 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 1/4/2022) (non-precedential).]

Ejectment Action by Foreign Trust

The successor trustee of a New York trust created by New York residents was entitled to a writ of possession for real estate transferred to the trust by the settlors during their lifetimes when the daughter of the settlors who was in possession of the property had no lease and no right of occupancy under the trust document, even though she had occupied the property with the consent of the settlors during their lifetimes. The validity and interpretation of the trust, and whether the costs of maintaining the property while it was occupied by the daughter following the deaths of the settlors should be paid from the daughter’s share of the trust, were issues to be decided by New York Courts under New York law. Grief, Trustee v. Cambria, 1 Fid.Rep.4th 234 (Monroe O.C. 2023).

Petition to Determine Names of Ancestors Denied

A petition to establish that the names on various birth certificates were alternate names of ancestors of the petitioner, which the petitioner alleged was needed for an application for dual Italian and American citizenship, was denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court, lack of any meaningful connection to Chester County, and lack of any controversy or dispute.  CzerwinskI v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, at al., 1 Fid.Rep.4th 234 (Chester O.C. 2023), (Opinion by Hall, J.).

[For a similar opinion, see In re Marino, 62 Ches. Co. L. Rep. 348, 4 Fid. Rep. 3rd 447 (9/25/2014) (Opinion by Hall, J.).]

Counsel Fees of Alleged Incapacitated Persons Denied

It was not an abuse of discretion for the Orphans’ Court to deny the attorney fees requested by a law firm representing alleged incapacitated persons (“AIPs”) when the firm’s engagement letter was voidable because it was signed by the AIPs after they had shown deficits in judgment and memory (and had been evaluated by doctors whose reports were introduced at the guardianship hearing), and the engagement letter referred only to a “property transaction.” The firm was also denied recovery in quantum meruit because it failed to meet its burden of showing that its services (and fees) were reasonable and necessary, and in its appeal the firm failed to identify the “substantial, significant evidence” in support of its fees that it claimed the court had disregarded and so waived that issue. Estate of A.J.M., 2024 PA Super 4, ___A.3d ___ (1/11/2024).

[DBE Commentary: The Superior Court stated that the denial of legal fees in no way deprived the AIPs of their right to representation by counsel of their choosing, and yet not allowing counsel to be paid would seem to limit the right to representation. A close reading of the opinion suggests that it was based on an unusual combination of circumstances, and that some of the problems the law firm faced were of its own making. For example: The lawyer in question met with potential clients (the AIPs) who were in their 80s and in cognitive decline, but apparently took no steps to independently evaluate their competence. The lawyer represented to the courts that the AIPs “vehemently” opposed the guardianship proceedings but they never testified during the guardianship proceedings and so there was no evidence in the record about their wishes. The AIPs already had powers of attorney naming their sons as agents, and the court found that the sons were “appropriately managing their affairs,” but the lawyer never consulted with the sons before preparing new powers of attorney and when the sons discovered that there were new powers of attorney naming a corporate fiduciary, they “immediately instituted the guardianship proceedings to protect their parents.” The lawyer appeared for the AIPs during the two day hearing, but did not call any witnesses or introduce any evidence on the issue of capacity. Finally, the lawyer claimed fees and costs of more than $37,000 but (according to the court) failed to explain how or why the legal services were so “extensive” as to justify those fees.]

Niece Not Named in Prior Wills Did Not Have Standing to Contest Later Will

The niece of the decedent did not have standing to contest the will of the decedent because she was not named as a beneficiary in the two previous wills of the decedent and was named only as a co-executor in the earliest will, which does not confer standing. Netzel Estate, 1 Fid.Rep.4th 223 (Allegheny O.C. 2022), aff’d, 984 WDA 2022 (Pa. Super. 8/11/2023) (non-precedential) (see “Executor under Prior Will Lacked Standing in Will Contest“).

Distribution of Royalties under Will after Disclaimer and with Ineffective Residuary Clause

The charitable bequest under the residuary clause being impossible to carry out, the Attorney General and all interested parties agreed that the clause was ineffective, so the residue of the estate would pass by intestacy. A disclaimer by one of the intestate heirs was valid, but the direction that the disclaimed share of the estate pass to another beneficiary of the estate was ineffective. The right to oil and gas royalties was intangible personal property and did not pass as part of a gift of personal belongings and tangible personal property. Hooper Estate (No. 1), 1 Fid.Rep.4th 208 (Susquehanna O.C. 2022).

In a supplemental opinion, the court held that the court’s questions during oral arguments about the executor’s changing legal positions was not evidence of judicial bias, and it was not improper for the court to cite as persuasive the reasoning of an unpublished opinion of a court of common pleas or deny a motion for reconsideration without any additional hearing. Hooper Estate (No. 2), 1 Fid.Rep.4th 216 (Susquehanna O.C. 2022), appeal quashed, 1183 MDA 2022 (Pa. Super. 9/8/2023) (non-precedential) (see “Appeal of Reconsideration Quashed“).

Common Law Marriage Not Proved and Barred by Laches

Claimant failed to prove common law marriage by clear and convincing evidence of constant cohabitation and general reputation when the decedent also maintained a relationship and household with another woman and there was an unclear reputation of marriage between the claimant and the decedent. The Dead Man’s Act made the claiming incompetent to testify to statements or agreements of the decedent, but she was competent to testify and present evidence as to proof of cohabitation and general reputation. The claimant’s appeal from the decree of the Register of Wills was also barred by laches because she failed to pursue her claim for thirteen years after filing the appeal in the Orphans’ Court. Coleman Estate, 1 Fid.Rep.4th 191 (Bucks O.C. 2023), aff’d, 535 EDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 2/6/2024) (non-precedential).

Interpretations of Directions in Will for Home

Direction in will that the decedent’s youngest daughter (to whom letters of administration were granted) should provide “shelter” at the decedent’s home for any other child “with no place to live” did not prevent the ejectment of a child who was found to spend at least two or three nights every week at his wife’s residence and so had another place to live. The designation of the daughter to be the “principal owner” of the decedent’s home was interpreted to be a specific gift to her, so the consent of the other children was not needed for the sale of the house, and the decedent’s “whiches” that “all my children have to sign” to sell the home was found to be precatory. Flores Estate, 1 Fid.Rep.4th 201 (Philadelphia O.C. 2020).

Error to Apply Cy Pres to Dissolving Fire Company

The Orphans’ Court properly refused to approve the distribution of the assets of a dissolving nonprofit corporation to organizations that did not provide firefighting services, but it was error to apply the cy pres doctrine to order distributions to two other firefighting organizations chosen by the court when the by-laws of the dissolving corporation allowed its members to choose the recipients. In re: Lincoln Fire Company, ___ A.4th ___, 479 C.D. 2022 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1/16/2024), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 12 Fid.Rep.3d 312 (Montgomery O.C. 2022).

Inexperienced Administrator Removed from Complex Estate

Decedent died owning several LLCs owning real estate in various states of disrepair, and with possible debts in excess of assets, and so the estate was possibly insolvent. The interests of the estate were likely to be jeopardized by the current administrator, who was the decedent’s daughter but only 20 years old, working full time, and inexperienced in real estate matters. Upon the petition of a creditor of the estate, and after two properties were sold without appraisals, the administrator was removed, and the decedent’s business partner (and girlfriend) was appointed as successor administrator. Price Estate, 1 Fid.Rep.4th 185 (Monroe O.C. 2023).