Transfer to Trust Revocable by Surviving Spouse Qualified for 0% Inheritance Tax Rate

A testamentary gift by a wife to a trust created by the husband and wife, and the transfers for the benefit of the surviving husband within the trust, both qualified for the 0% inheritance tax rate as transfers “for the use of” the surviving spouse. In re: Estate of Anne Mae Crum, ___ A.4th ___, 223 C.D. 2023 (Pa. Cmwlth. 3/12/2025).

DBE Commentary:

The result in the case would seem to be so obvious that it is difficult to understand the position of the Department of Revenue, or the rationale of the Orphans’ Court of Cumberland County that ruled in its favor. The key to the problem may lie in the definition of “sole use trust” and the illogic of that definition.

Husband and wife created a joint trust with husband as sole trustee, and were each entitled to half of the income while they were both living. Following the death of the wife, the husband remained the sole trustee, had the right to receive all of the income, could pay income and principal to himself or others, and could revoke or amend the trust. The husband reported the wife’s half of the trust on the inheritance tax return, along with the value of a testamentary gift to the trust under the wife’s will, and applied the spousal inheritance tax rate of 0% to both transfers. The Department of Revenue (DOR) disagreed, and assessed tax at 15%. Husband appealed to the Board of Appeals, which upheld the DOR, and then appealed to the Orphans’ Court, which also upheld the DOR. The husband then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which reversed.

Reading the Commonwealth Court’s opinion, it is difficult to understand the position of the DOR, much less agree with it.

For example, the court stated that the DOR claimed that there “was no inter-spousal transfer … because the Trust was the owner.” But that is true of every revocable trust with assets that continue to be held in trust for a beneficiary, and yet the inheritance tax is always calculated based on the tax rate that applies to the beneficiary of a trust. Taking the argument of the DOR to its illogical conclusion, every transfer to a trust would be subject to a transfer tax of 15%, which is clearly not the law and never has been.

The DOR also argued that the tax rate applicable to surviving spouse applies only to “outright transfer between a husband and wife and is entirely inapplicable to the transfer of assets in trust where the beneficiary happens to be the surviving spouse,” even though the statute, 72 P.S. § 9116(a)(1.1) states clearly refers to transfers of property passing “to or for the use of a husband or wife.” (The phrase “for the use of” a person is traditionally used to refer to a transfer in trust for the benefit of a person.)

This is speculation, but it is possible that the DOR chose to take what seem like unsustainable positions because of the problems it may have created for itself through the narrow definition of “sole use trust.” As originally enacted, 72 P.S. § 9112 allowed a trust for the “sole use” of the surviving spouse to escape all tax at the first death, and be taxed only at the second death, but provided no definition of “sole use.” A definition of “sole use” was added by the Act of December 23, 2003, P.L. 250, No. 46 (apparently to reverse the result in In re Estate of Goldman, 781 A. 2d 259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001), and that definition in 72 P.S. § 9102 specifically states that a trust is not a “sole use” trust unless “no person, including the transferee, possesses an inter vivos power of appointment over the property.” So if the interests of a deceased spouse pass to a trust in which the surviving spouse is entitled to all of the income and can withdraw all of the principal at any time, that trust is not a sole use trust and, because powers of appointment or withdrawal are not subject to inheritance tax, the trust will not be taxable at the death of the surviving spouse. In order to prevent that result, the DOR argued that the interests of the deceased spouse were subject to inheritance tax at 15%, and lost.

So this decision may create a big inheritance tax loophole, and the DOR may seek a legislative solution (although an appeal to the Supreme Court is also possible).

Error to Enter Order without Opportunity to Respond

It was error for the Orphans’ Court to enter an order declaring an agreement between the decedent’s widow and the administrator of the estate to be null and void when the motion regarding the agreement had been filed only two days earlier and the administrator had not yet had the 20 days within which to file a responsive pleading allowed by Pa. R.O.C.P. 3.7(a). In re: Estate of Joseph D. Kowalski, 127 WDA 2024 (Pa. Super. 2/4/2025) (non-precedential).

Claim for Lifetime Transfer not Barred by Statute of Limitations or Res Judicata

Husband was alleged to have improperly converted assets held jointly with his wife into his own name before his death. An action by the estate of the deceased wife against the estate of the deceased husband was not barred by the statute of limitations when it was brought within two years of the discovery of the conversion by the executor of the wife’s estate. The action was also not barred by res judicata because the earlier dismissal of objections to the inventory of the husband’s estate was not a decision on the merits, the court stating that the attempt to recover the property transferred during lifetime had to proceed “in different forms.” Estate of Margaret C. Seeney v. Estate of Harold S. Seeney, 1267 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. 1/30/2025) (non-precendential).

Lawyers as “Specialists” without Certification

It was not previously reported here, but in late 2024 the Supreme Court amended the Rules of Professional Conduct to update many of the rules relating to lawyer publicity and advertising. A change that might be particularly relevant to estate and trust practitioners is an amendment to expand the circumstances under which a lawyer might claim to be a “specialist.”

Previously, Pa. Rule of Professional Conduct 7.4 had provided that a lawyer (other than a patent lawyer or admiralty lawyer) could not claim to be a “specialist” unless the lawyer had been certified by an organization approved by the Supreme Court. The general rule that a lawyer may not claim to be a specialist continues under amended Rule 7.2(c), but in addition to the previous exceptions, there is a new exception in Rule 7.2(c)(3):

“(3) a lawyer who is not certified as a specialist as described in paragraphs (1) or (2) above may not claim to be a specialist in a particular field of law unless the lawyer can objectively verify the claim based upon the lawyer’s experience, specialized training or education, and the claim is not otherwise false or misleading in violation of Rule 7.1, see Comment (8);
”  (i) a lawyer who communicates a specialty under this paragraph (3) shall include a disclaimer stating that the lawyer is not certified in the claimed specialty;
”  (ii) a lawyer may not claim specialization in more than one field of law;”

The Comment 8 referred to in the above rule provides the following explanation:

(8)  Paragraph (c) of this Rule generally permits a lawyer to communicate that the lawyer does or does not practice in a particular area of law. Under paragraph (c)(3), a lawyer is permitted to state that the lawyer ”concentrates in” or is a ”specialist,” practices a ”specialty,” or ”specializes in” particular fields based on the lawyer’s objectively verifiable experience, specialized training or education. Such communications are subject to the ”false and misleading” standard applied in Rule 7.1 to communications concerning a lawyer’s services. Authorizing such objectively verifiable statements comports with constitutional limitations on the regulation of commercial speech. Appropriate bases for a lawyer’s claim of specialization under paragraph (c)(3) may include the proportion of the lawyer’s practice devoted to the specialty, the years of experience practicing the specialty, the continued education acquired pertaining to the specialty, and the recency of the experience or education in the field of specialization.”

A lawyer with appropriate experience or education may therefore claim to be an “estate and trust specialist” even without any formal certification.

“Amendment of Rules 5.5, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.7 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct; No. 252 Disciplinary Rules Docket” (10/15/2024), 54 Pa.B. 6696 (10/26/2024).

Trust Situs: Jurisdiction, Governing Law, and Taxation

The word “situs,” from the Latin for “position” or “location,” is often used in connection with three different issues: which state’s courts have jurisdiction over the administration of the trust, which state’s laws govern the interpretation or administration of the…

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Cumberland Co. Adopts O.C. Discovery Rule

Cumberland County has adopted a new local rule for discovery in its Orphans’ Court, as well as other local rules for civil actions, and custody and divorce proceedings. “Local Rules; Civil Term; 96-1335 Civil” (1/22/2025), 55 Pa.B. 904 (2/1/2025); “Local Rules; Civil Term; 96-1335 Civil” (2/19/2025), 55 Pa.B. 1792 (3/1/2025).

[Note: It appears that Cumberland County adopted the same rules twice, and the court’s 2/19/2025 order provides no explanation as to why.]

Will Forgery Proved

In an appeal of a will contest alleging forgery, the appellant waived objections to the propriety of the Orphans’ Court relying on samples of the decedent’s signature that were not formally moved into or admitted into evidence because the court marked the samples as exhibits, took testimony about them, and appeared to intend to use the samples as record evidence and the appellant did not object. It was not an abuse of discretion for the court to find the testimony of the decedent’s lawyer to be credible in denying the authenticity of decedent’s signature on the alleged will even after a motion for reconsideration showing that the lawyer had misled the court on other issues. The findings of the Orphans’ Court that the witnesses to the alleged were “simply mistaken” in their testimony about the preparation and execution of the will were supported by the record, and the will was shown to be a forgery by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Justino Petaccio, Deceased, 635 EDA 2024 (Pa. Super. 12/24/2024) (non-precedential).