A right of occupancy (which is different from a life estate) granted by the decedent’s will was not invalid or void against public policy merely because the decedent had no certificate of occupancy and the structure appeared to be in violation of building codes, and so the petition of the executor to sell the property was denied. Miller Estate, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 231 (OC Chest. 2015) (Opinion by Tunnell, J.)
After a community ambulance association, a non-profit corporation, lost the authorization of their sponsoring community, the corporation was liquidated, and an account was filed with the court; the court confirmed the account (after amendment) and directed distributions. Coaldale Community Ambulance, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 240 (OC Schuyl. 2015) (Opinion by Baldwin, P.J.)
In Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, No 14-556 (6/26/15), the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment for states to deny marriages licenses to same-sex couples, or to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully entered into in other states. This decision was a natural progression from the decision in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2675, No. 12-307 (2013), which held that it was a violation of the 5th Amendment for the federal government to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages that were lawfully entered into under state law.
The Obergefell decision will not have much impact in Pennsylvania because Pennsylvania was already recognizing same-sex marriages in accordance with the federal district court decision in Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014), but Obergefell affirms the conclusion of the district court, eliminating any possibility of any disputes about the validity or effect of the Whitewood decision.
And there are still some questions about the possible retroactive application of the Whitewood and Obergefell decisions. Generally speaking, constitutional decisions are given retroactive effect according to the principle (or perhaps the fiction) that the Constitution hasn’t really changed and what the Constitution requires now is what the Constitution has always required. However, there are practical limits, so that (for example) the Internal Revenue Service has stated that same-sex couples could file amended tax returns as married filing jointly only for those years for which the statute of limitations for refunds had not run. (See IRS Notice 2014-19.)
I had previously commented that it was possible that Pennsylvania might have to recognize a same-sex common law marriage if the couple exchanged wedding vows before 2005, and the holding in Obergefell may make that even more likely. If two couples appear in court, each claiming the existence of a common law marriage entered into before 2005, and the only difference between the two couples is that one is a same-sex couple and one is an opposite-sex couple, it would seem to be a violation of equal protection to recognize the opposite-sex marriage but not the same-sex marriage.
The other situation in which Obergefell and Whitewood would have some retroactive effect would be for couples that were married in other states and purchased property in Pennsylvania in joint names. The presumption in Pennsylvania is that, when property is purchased by a married couple in their joint names, title is taken as tenants by the entireties, and not as tenants in common. (An important difference between the two forms of ownership is that tenants in common are considered to each own an undivided one half interest in the property, so a creditor of once spouse can attach that spouse’s half of the property, but entireties property cannot be attached by a creditor of one spouse, because the property is considered to be owned by the marital unit.) If two unmarried people buy property and then later marry, the property is not converted to entireties property because the buyers have to be married at the time of the purchase. But if a same-sex couple was married in New York or Massachusetts, and they move to Pennsylvania and buy property in Pennsylvania, the property should be considered to be entireties property because they were already married at the time the property was purchased, even if Pennsylvania did not recognize the marriage at the time the property was purchased.
If I were counseling a same-sex couple, I would recommend that they not depend on retroactive applications of rulings, but that they get a marriage license and confirm their marriage with a new ceremony even if they exchanged vows before 2005, or that they re-title their property as tenancy by the entireties even if they were married under the laws of another state at the time they purchased the property. But sometimes those things aren’t possible (such as a death having already occurred), or aren’t considered while they are possible, so we’ll probably see these issues in the future.
Husband and wife contracted with surrogate mother to deliver the baby from husband’s sperm and a donor’s egg. During the pregnancy, husband and wife separated. The surrogate mother petitioned the court to declare husband and wife as parents of Baby S. The court declared husband and wife (wife was the adverse party) as the legal parents of Baby S, and held that all fees and costs obligated under the contract enforceable against wife, holding that the contract did not violate public policy. In re: Baby S, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 221 (O.C. Montg. 2015) (Opinion by Ott, J.), aff’d, 2015 PA Super 244, No. 1259 EDA 2015 (11/23/2015).
Executor filed an account valuing two closely held companies by its market value, which means a willing seller to a willing buyer; objectors, two of four residuary beneficiaries, claimed that the shareholder agreement specified a pro rata valuation, meaning dividing the companies’ values by the amount of shares; and the court held that the shareholders agreement was ambiguous, allowing parole evidence, and confirmed the account, because the evidence indicated that the “market value” specified in the shareholders agreement incorporated market variables, such as marketability and controlling interest. Bittner Estate, 5 Fid. Rep. 3d 242 (OC Bedford 2014) (Opinion by Livengood, J.), aff’d No. 1847 WDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 1/29/2016).
When a hospital becomes part of a larger health care organization, but continues to operate as separate organization at the same location serving the same community, the cy pres doctrine should not be applied to require a pour-over trust and special accounting measures to prevent charitable trust income from indirectly benefiting the health care organization, but it was proper to order that the hospital’s articles of incorporation be amended to require that donor restricted funds be used solely for the operation of the hospital. In re: Grover C. Shoemaker Trust, 115 A.3d 347, 2015 PA Super 111, No. (5/7/2015).
The Internal Revenue Service has issued T.D. 9725 containing final regulations on electing portability for the deceased spousal unused exclusion (DSUE) amount. Among the revisions that were made (and not made) to the proposed and temporary regulations are the following:
- The portability election must be made on a timely filed return, and an extension of time to file a return to elect portability may be allowed under Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3 if a return is not required to be filed because the gross estate is too small to require a return (see Rev. Proc. 2014-18), but not if an estate tax return is otherwise required (although an extension may be allowed under IRC section 6081).
- Only an “executor” as defined by IRC section 2203 can file the estate tax return to elect portability.
- If an estate tax return is not otherwise required, only descriptions, and not values, are required for assets qualifying for marital or charitable deductions, subject to exceptions for partial interests, values needed to determine other non-deductible interests, and values needed to determine the eligibility of the estate under other transfer tax provisions.
- The IRS considered, and rejected, requests for a shorter Form 706 for portability elections.
- The general rule is that a non-citizen surviving spouse cannot apply the DSUE until the final amount of any additional estate tax on a qualified domestic trust has been determined, such as at the spouse’s death, but an exception to that rule has been created when the surviving spouse becomes a US citizen.
- In examining the return of a decedent who claims credit for DSUE from a deceased spouse, the IRS may examine the return of the deceased spouse for purposes of determining the correct amount of DSUE even though the statute of limitations does not allow for an assessment of tax in the estate of the deceased spouse, and the examination is not limited to the valuation of assets but can include any issue affect the calculation of the DSUE.
- Under Rev. Proc. 2001-38, the IRS will disregard a QTIP election that is not necessary to avoid federal estate tax, but it may be desirable in some cases to file an estate tax return to elect portability and make a QTIP election even though the QTIP election is not necessary to avoid federal estate. This issue is not addressed in the final regulations, but the IRS stated that it intends to provide guidance in a future Internal Revenue Bulletin.
- The DSUE cannot be increased by applying credits other than the unified credit (such as the foreign tax credit and credit for property previously taxed) before applying the unified credit.
The final regulations are generally applicable to estates of decedents dying on or after June 12, 2015.
There is an American Bar Association web page with summaries and links to various state opinions on the ethics of storing confidential client information on off-site “cloud computing” services of third parties. Included is a link to Formal Opinion 2011-200…
Court approved permanency plan with goal of adoption for children who had been removed from home and declared dependent after finding that father, a registered sex offender, had a history of sexual conduct with minors and was not cooperating with sexual offender treatment, and that mother was unable to recognize risk that father posed to children, the county agency having made reasonable efforts toward reunification of children with parents. In re M.Y., Jr. and T.J., 5 Fid.Rep.3d 216 (Juv. Div. Berks 2013), aff’d, 1843 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. 5/6/2016) (memorandum by Musmanno, J.).